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@mattblaze@federate.social

2026-11-05 03:10 UTC

Modern tally systems, such as optical-scan ballot readers, are controlled by software. Software is notoriously unreliable and subject to unexpected bugs, even after rigorous testing, and the software used in ballot tally systems has proven to be no exception. But worse, software is designed to be *replaceable*, which means that it may be possible for an adversary to replace the tally software with malware that reports any result the attacker desires, and then erases its tracks. 4/

Replies (1)

  • @mattblaze@federate.social 2026-11-05 03:15

    Fotunately, there's a reliable, rigorous, and efficient safeguard against tally system errors and malway, and it works for any voting system that has reliable paper ballots. It was invented about 20 years ago by Berkeley statistician Phillip Stark. The method is called "Risk Limiting Audits" (RLAs), and is regarded as the gold standard for protecting elections against tabulation errors or malice. 5/

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