Andrew Ayer
agwa@follow.agwa.name
@agwa@agwa.name<br/><br/>Bootstrapped founder of SSLMate (<a href="https://sslmate.com">https://sslmate.com</a>) and DNS Helper (<a href="https://www.dnshelper.com">https://www.dnshelper.com</a>). Making SSL certificates and DNS records easier. <a class="hashtag" data-tag="webpki" href="https://follow.agwa.name/tag/webpki">#WebPKI</a> and <a class="hashtag" data-tag="certificatetransparency" href="https://follow.agwa.name/tag/certificatetransparency">#CertificateTransparency</a> research on the side.
Posts
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Install software updates =&gt; bitten by AI-written bugs Don&#39;t install software updates =&gt; pwned by AI-discovered vulnerabilities Uninstall all software =&gt; inner peace
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@christopherkunz Cool, thanks posting your comment in the bug. I also relayed your findings to mdsp yesterday: https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/SgwC1QsEpvc/m/hV0LJBkUAAAJ
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@christopherkunz These are excellent discoveries! Do you want to post this to the mozilla-dev-security-policy thread (https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/SgwC1QsEpvc). Or I can relay them, with or without attribution.
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@mnordhoff Oh no, did I accidentally DDOS crtsh? That's the subject serial number which is used to identify the company in OV/EV certs. I'm guessing it's a Hungarian tax identifier.
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@cks I would like SCGI more if you could reuse connections. I don't mean multiplexing but just being able to send another request after the first one finishes.
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Certum, Cybertrust Japan, GlobalSign, Izenpe, NAVER, SECOM, SHECA, SSL.com, and TWCA are all issuing busted SSL certificates because instead of reading Apple and Chrome's JSON log lists which tell them exactly which Certificate Transparency logs are safe to use, they're assuming any log with "2027h1" in the name is good: https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/ct-policy/20251202114350.acbfe1173c6cad1aadfb98c7%40andrewayer.name If you got a certificate from any of thes...
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New blog post: Certificate Authorities Are Once Again Issuing Certificates That Don&#39;t Work https://www.agwa.name/blog/post/cas_are_issuing_broken_certificates_again
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Before I use a third-party Go package, I like to know its transitive dependencies. I can&#39;t just look at go.mod, because it lists dependencies for all the packages in the module, not just the package I&#39;m importing. So I made a little web page that runs `go list -deps` to get the real dependencies of a package: https://sourcespotter.com/deps/
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I just released govulncheck-deep, a program that recursively descends deep into archive files, S3 buckets, APT repos, etc. and runs govulncheck on every Go binary that it finds. I run it daily to make sure SSLMate&#39;s production environment stays free of known vulns. There are other tools that do deep vulnerability scanning (e.g. Trivy), but they don&#39;t use govulncheck so they&#39;re overrun with false positives. https://github.com/AGWA/deepscan
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New blog post: Why IP Address Certificates Are Dangerous and Usually Unnecessary https://www.agwa.name/blog/post/ip_address_certs
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The first rogue 1.1.1.1 certificate was issued by Fina and logged to Certificate Transparency over a year ago. AFAICT, the first person to notice any of this was Hacker News user JXzVB0iA, two days ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45089708 This morning, it was reported to the certificate-transparency mailing list, with attribution to JXzVB0iA. A few hours later, it was reported to the mozilla-dev-security-policy mailing list, without attribution. Then Dan Goodin wrote his article, citin...
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The State of OpenSSL for pyca/cryptography: https://cryptography.io/en/latest/statements/state-of-openssl/ Spoiler: it&#39;s bad.